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Six days after 9/11, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) agents
ransacked, threatened, interrogated, and arrested Ahmed Farid Khorrami, an
Iranian-born British citizen, at his office in Chicago, despite the fact that he
was legally authorized to be in the United States. Dr. Khorrami was detained
for three months before an immigration judge granted his request for
permanent resident status based on his marriage to a U.S. citizen.2 After his
release, Dr. Khorrami filed a Bivens action in federal district court, claiming
monetary damages to redress his injuries based on the constitutional violations
committed by the INS agents during his wrongful arrest and detention.3 If the
unlawful actions had been committed by FBI agents investigating a federal
crime, the government would have conceded that a federal court has
jurisdiction to hear the damages claims. However, because the acts were
committed by immigration officials attempting to deport a foreign national,
the government argued that section 242(g) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA) completely bars judicial review of such claims. Section 242(g) states:
Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other
provision of law.., no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or
claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by
the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or
1. Khorrami v. Rolince, 493 F. Supp. 2d lo6i, iO65 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
2. Id. at 1o66.
3. A Bivens action is named after the Supreme Court case Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Bivens held that private parties can recover
money damages for injuries resulting from constitutional violations committed by federal
employees. Id. at 397.
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execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter [dealing
with removal orders] .'
The district court agreed with the government's broad interpretation of the
jurisdiction-stripping provision, and barred Dr. Khorrami's Fourth
Amendment Bivens claim challenging his false arrest and detention.'
Dr. Khorrami's case is just one of many immigration-related lawsuits
where the government has used section 242(g) in an attempt to bar judicial
review of monetary damages claims, brought under Bivens and the Federal Tort
Claims Act 6 (FTCA), for injuries stemming from the unlawful actions of
immigration agents. While these lawsuits were rare in the past, the Bush
Administration's abuse of immigration law after 9/117 and recent events like
inhumane immigration raids8 have energized civil rights lawyers to pursue
damages claims. In return, in almost every lawsuit alleging wrongful conduct
by immigration agents, the government has argued that section 242(g) bars
review.
Ever since the jurisdiction-stripping provision was enacted in 1996, federal
courts have struggled over whether section 242(g) prohibits damages claims.
On the one hand, the Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have precluded damages
claims under section 242(g), holding that the conduct alleged arose from
actions to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders. 9
4. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 242(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (2006).
s. Khorrami, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 1070.
6. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-268o. Unlike Bivens, which seeks redress for constitutional violations
committed by individual federal officers, the Federal Tort Claims Act permits private parties
to sue the United States for most torts committed by individuals acting on behalf of the
federal government.
7. See, e.g., Turkmen v. Ashcroft, No. 02-CV-2307, 20o6 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39170 (E.D.N.Y.
June 14, 2006) (describing how hundreds of Muslim noncitizens were mentally and
physically abused while being detained in New York-area detention centers after 9/11).
8. See, e.g., Nina Bernstein, Raids Were a Shambles, Nassau Complains to U.S., N.Y. TIMEs, Oct.
3, 2007, at Bi (describing a raid in New York State in which federal immigration agents
"wearing cowboy hats and brandishing shotguns and automatic weapons" mistakenly drew
their guns on local police, U.S. citizens, and other legal residents); Jennifer Medina, Arrests
of31 in U.S. Sweep Bring Fear in New Haven, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2007, at Bi (describing
dragnet-style raid in which "immigration officials knocked on their doors and demanded to
speak with every adult in the house, then asked for identification" as well as giving
preferential treatment to the mothers - but not the fathers - of children).
g. See Sissoko v. Rocha, 509 F.3d 947 (9 th Cit. 2007); Adegbuji v. Fifteen Immigration &
Customs Enforcement Agents, 169 F. App'x 733 (3d Cir. 2006); Foster v. Townsley, 243 F.3d




On the other hand, the Tenth Circuit, and district courts in the Second, Sixth,
and Fourth Circuits have rejected the applicability of section 242(g), construing
the provision narrowly and permitting the claims in order to avoid "grave
constitutional issues."
This Comment argues that the government's reading of section 242(g) not
only contravenes congressional intent, but also contradicts the Supreme
Court's ruling in Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee"
(AADC) to interpret the provision narrowly. Because section 242(g) bars
neither legal challenges to nondiscretionary government action nor challenges
that do not directly contest the removal process, courts should have jurisdiction
to hear monetary damages claims brought by foreign nationals against
immigration agents.
I. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT UNDERLYING SECTION 242(g)
While the federal government has urged courts to read section 242(g)
broadly to eliminate judicial review of almost all removal-related damages
actions, it is doubtful that Congress intended the provision to be interpreted in
such a way when enacting the section as part of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 2 (IIRIRA).
A. Legislative History of Section 242(g)
On its face, section 242(g) appears broad, as to abolish judicial review of
practically every claim of a noncitizen challenging aspects of his detention or
removal not specifically authorized under the INA. However, IIRIRA's
legislative history demonstrates that Congress never intended for section
242(g) to strip federal court jurisdiction over damages actions brought by
noncitizens against immigration officials. In fact, the little legislative history on
this issue confirms that Congress never considered barring these lawsuits.
Instead, the intent of the provision was to reinforce one of the major purposes
io. Medina v. United States, 92 F. Supp. 2d 545, 553 (E.D. Va. 2000), vacated on other grounds,
259 F.3 d 220 (4 th Cir. 2001); see, e.g., Dalis v. United States, No. 99-1248, 2000 WL 339173
(0oth Cir. Mar. 31, 2000); Turnbull v. United States, No. 1:o6cv858, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
53054, at "14-15 (N.D. Ohio July 23, 2007); Turkmen v. Ashcroft, No. 02-CV-2307, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39170, at *83 (E.D.N.Y. June 14, 2006); Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d
250 (E.D.N.Y. 20o6), affd on other grounds, No. o6-4216-cv, 2009 WL 3522887 (2d Cir. Nov.
2, 2009).
11. 525 U.S. 471 (1999).
12. Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 11o Stat. 3009-546.
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of section 242 and the statute as a whole: "to streamline removal proceedings
and enhance enforcement of immigration laws that had gone largely
unchanged since 1952."'
3
In the months leading up to IIRIRA's enactment, the legislative history
confirms that the Act's jurisdiction-stripping provisions were created to make
it easier to remove deportable noncitizens. For example, in congressional
testimony in March 1995, the INS general counsel stated that "[t]he
Administration is committed to ensuring that aliens in deportation proceedings
are afforded appropriate due process; however, the availability of multiple
layers of judicial review has frustrated the timely removal of deportable
aliens.' 4 Similarly, in April 1996, the Senate Report of the Act stated that the
judicial review provisions were intended to "expedit[e] the removal of
excludable and deportable aliens."'" In fact, the Act's section on judicial review
was originally entitled: "Streamlining Judicial Review of Orders of Exclusion
or Deportation. ",, 6 Finally, in September 1996, the Act's joint conference report
reinforced the streamlining purpose of section 242, stating that the INA was
amended "to improve deterrence of illegal immigration to the United States...
by reforming exclusion and deportation law and procedures." 7
Notwithstanding the Act's seemingly good intentions of streamlining the
review process, a few members of Congress had warned about the dangers of
restricting judicial review of removal orders. For example, Congressman
Nadler stated: "The bill eliminates judicial review for most INS actions. Just
think, a Federal bureaucracy with no judicial accountability. . . . No
13. Patricia Flynn & Judith Patterson, Five Years Later: Fifth Circuit Case Law Developments
Under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 557,
561 (2001).
14. Removal of Criminal and Illegal Aliens: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and
Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 15 (1995) (statement of T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Gen. Counsel, Immigration and Naturalization Serv.).
15. S. REP. No. 104-249, at 2 (1996); see also id. (describing purposes of IIRIRA as including
"[s]treanlining exclusion and deportation procedures," "increasing the disincentives for
repeated illegal entry or visa overstay," and "[e]stablishing special procedures to expedite
the removal of criminal aliens").
16. S. 1664, lo4th Cong. § 142 (1996).
17. H.R. REP. No. 104-828, at 199 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). Similarly, in 2005, when Congress
amended section 242(g) as part of the REAL ID Act, its purpose was to further streamline
the removal process by explicitly barring habeas corpus review and other review that could
delay a deportable noncitizen's departure from the United States, such as mandamus actions
and actions under the All Writs Act. See H.R. REP. No. 109-72, at 173-75 (2005).
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government agency should be allowed to act, much less lock people up or send
them back to dictatorships, without being subject to court review."'
8
B. Understanding Section 242(g) Through Canons of Statutory Silence
Although the legislative history and text are silent on whether the INA bars
damages claims, one may argue, as the government has done, that Congress's
silence on the issue, coupled with section 242(g)'s broad wording, substantiates
Congressman Nadler's fears: that Congress intended to bar judicial review of
most actions by immigration officials, including Bivens and FTCA claims.
However, this reading of section 242(g) belies both the statutory development
and structure of section 242, the INA's section on judicial review.
First, prior to IIRIRA, courts had upheld immigration-related Bivens and
FTCA claims for years, " even though the INA had previously contained a
similar judicial review provision. 20 Therefore, in the absence of any text or
legislative history indicating Congress's intention to diverge from past practice
and preclude damages actions, Supreme Court precedent is clear that courts
should not infer a break from the prior statute.2 Second, section 242 expressly
eliminated or limited judicial review and relief in many areas of immigration
law, including crime-related deportation grounds, 2 types of discretionary
decisions, 3 and provisions regarding entry and inadmissibility. 4 Therefore,
under the principle of expressio unius, the inclusion in section 242 of express and
multiple bars to both review and relief implies that Congress did not mean to
preclude damages claims s.2  Third, because Bivens actions challenge the
18. 142 CONG. REC. H11o71, Hio85 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996) (statement ofRep. Nadler).
ig. For Bivens claims, see, for example, Arevalo v. Woods, 811 F.2d 487 (9 th Cir. 1987). For FTCA
claims, see, for example, Sanchez v. Rowe, 651 F. Supp 571, 574 (N.D. Tex. 1986).
20. See 8 U.S.C. § ioSa (1994).
21. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396 & n.23 (1991) ("In a case where the construction of
legislative language such as this makes so sweeping and so relatively unorthodox a change as
that made here, I think judges as well as detectives may take into consideration that a
watchdog did not bark in the night." (quoting Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 426 U.S. 578,
602 (198o) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504,
521-22 (1989) ("A party contending that legislative action changed settled law has the
burden of showing that the legislature intended such a change.").
22. See 8 U.S.C. § 125 2(a) (2) (C) (2006).
23. See id. § 1252(a)(2)(B).
24. See id. § 1252(f)(1).
2S. See Guo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 422 F.3d 61, 64 (2d Cir. 2005) (applying the expressio unius
principle to the INA); BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1635 (7th ed. 1999) (defining expressio unius
est exclusio alterius as "[t]he expression of one thing is the exclusion of another").
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constitutionality of government action, to read Congress's silence as barring
these claims would violate the long-standing principle that jurisdictional
statutes should not be construed to preclude review of constitutional claims
absent the most explicit directive from Congress.26 Finally, to read Congress's
silence as barring FTCA claims would mean that in enacting IIRIRA, Congress
had implicitly repealed the FTCA as it applied in the immigration context. This
reading would violate the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that repeals
by implication are strongly disfavored.
7
C. The Text of Section 242(g)
A textual analysis of section 242(g) also demonstrates that the provision
was meant only to bar review of removal orders in order to expedite the
removal of deportable noncitizens. First, Congress titled INA section 242-
from which section 242(g) is drawn -"Judicial review of orders of removal."28
To the extent any ambiguity exists, section 242, in its entirety, should be
construed only to limit review of removal orders, not independent damages
actions.9 Second, section 242(g) bars claims "arising from" actions by
immigration officials.3" Because Congress did not choose the phrase "related
to" or some other broader language, Hiroshi Motomura has argued that the
narrower "arising from" language demonstrates that Congress did not intend
to bar damages claims or others collateral to the removal process.31
Finally, section 242(g) eliminates judicial review specifically for three types
of actions: "to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal
orders. '32 While IIRIRA's legislative history offers little clarification as to why
26. See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003) ("'[W]here Congress intends to preclude
judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear."' (quoting Webster
v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988))).
27. See, e.g., Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 66o-6i (1996); see also United States v. Sforza, 326
F. 3d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[W]ell-established law strongly disfavors preclusion of one
federal statute by another absent express manifestations of preclusive intent.").
28. INA § 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
29. See INS v. Nat'l Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, 502 U.S. 183, 189 (1991) ("[T]he title of a
statute or section can aid in resolving an ambiguity in the legislation's text.").
30. See INA § 242(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).
31. Hiroshi Motomura, Judicial Review in Immigration Cases After AADC: Lessons from Civil
Procedure, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 385, 431 (2000); see also Humphries v. Various Fed. USINS
Employees, 164 F.3d 936, 943 (5th Cit. 1999) ("'[A]rising from' does seem to describe a
nexus somewhat more tight than the also frequently used phrase 'related to.'" (quoting INA
§ 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252)).
32. INA § 242(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).
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these three actions were delineated, the Supreme Court's reasoning in AADC,33
the touchstone case interpreting section 242(g), is compelling. The Court
stated that the three
discrete acts ... represent the initiation or prosecution of various stages
in the deportation process. At each stage the Executive has discretion to
abandon the endeavor, and at the time IIRIRA was enacted the INS
had been engaging in a regular practice ... of exercising that discretion
for humanitarian reasons or simply for its own convenience.
34
However, by exercising prosecutorial discretion, the INS had opened the
door to litigation over these decisions. Therefore, section 242(g) was created to
restrict judicial review only of discretionary decisions made by immigration
agents stemming from these three discrete acts of the removal process.3"
II. APPLYING SECTION 242(g) TO MONETARY DAMAGES ACTIONS
Based on this more nuanced understanding of how Congress intended INA
Section 242(g) to apply, it is clear that, but for the following two caveats, the
provision does not bar Bivens and FTCA claims. First, the damages claims need
to challenge nondiscretionary actions committed by immigration officials.
Second, the claims must not directly challenge the removal process. If these
two conditions are met, then section 242(g) does not deprive federal courts of
jurisdiction to hear damages claims regarding unlawful action committed by
immigration enforcement agents against noncitizens.
A. Section 242(g) Applies Only to Discretionary Decisions
In AADC, the Supreme Court stated that section 242(g) only bars removal-
related claims that challenge immigration officials' exercise of discretionary
authority, that is, only those decisions that Congress has committed to the
discretion of the Attorney General. 36 The Supreme Court's holding was
predicated on its finding that the claim in that case was encompassed within
the scope of section 242(g) because it challenged the Attorney General's
exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The plaintiffs in AADC argued that the
33. 525 U.S. 471 (1999).
34. Id. at 483-84.
35- Id. at 484-85.
36. Id. at 482.
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Court should enjoin the Attorney General from commencing removal
proceedings against them, notwithstanding the fact that, as plaintiffs conceded,
the Attorney General had lawful authority to deport them on the basis of
technical visa violations. 7 The Court emphasized that section 242(g) applied
because the decision to commence proceedings in that case was purely
discretionary.
Under the reasoning in AADC, if damages actions against immigration
officials challenged nondiscretionary decisions, they would not be barred under
section 242(g). Courts have made it clear that government officials do not have
discretion to violate the law or the Constitution? 8 Noncitizen plaintiffs in
Bivens and FTCA claims do not contest how discretionary authority was
exercised, but instead argue that immigration officials were acting beyond their
discretion, in a manner ultra vires, by violating the Constitution and tort law,
respectively. As mentioned above, to read section 242(g) otherwise would
preclude review of constitutional claims without explicit direction from
Congress. 9
The federal government, and some courts, have responded to this
argument by suggesting that foreign nationals could bring the same
constitutional claims in a habeas petition (before the enactment of the REAL
ID Act4") or a petition for review to the courts of appeals.41 However, this
reasoning is misplaced. The petition for review process refers to judicial review
of a final agency action. The only relief available under a petition for review is
to reverse or undo an underlying removal order, or obtain relief from that
order in the form of vacatur or a new removal proceeding. The only relief
available in habeas corpus actions is release from detention. FTCA and Bivens
plaintiffs do not seek this relief. Instead, they seek damages for harm stemming
from their arrest, detention, and conditions of confinement -unconstitutional
treatment that could not have been redressed on a petition for review or in
37. Id. at 473.
38. See, e.g., Demote v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003) ("[W]here Congress intends to preclude
judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear."); Myers & Myers,
Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 527 F.2d 1252, 1261 (2d Cit. 1975) ("It is, of course, a tautology that
a federal official cannot have discretion to behave unconstitutionally or outside the scope of
his delegated authority.").
39. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
40. See supra note 17.
41. See, e.g., Arias v. ICE, No. 07-1959, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34072, at *17-19 (D. Minn. Apr.
23, 2008) (denying Bivens claims because noncitizens should have brought claims in a
petition for review to the court of appeals); Khorrami v. Rolince, 493 F. Supp. 2d lo61, 1O69




habeas corpus proceedings. Moreover, unlike habeas proceedings or petitions
for review, damages actions are unique in that they provide an important
deterrent against similar illegal government action in the future.
B. Section 242(g) Does Not Apply to Challenges Collateral to Removal
Proceedings
The second circumstance in which section 242(g) does not apply to
damages claims is when the claims arise outside the context of removal
proceedings. As the Supreme Court held in AADC, section 242(g) applies
narrowly to "three discrete events along the road to deportation."4 2 This
reading of section 242(g) is consistent with both the text and legislative history
of the statute, which confirm that the purpose of section 242 is to streamline
the deportation process to ensure the prompt removal of deportable
noncitizens. 43 Section 242(g) furthers this goal by barring jurisdiction over a
cause or claim arising from the Attorney General's commencement or
prosecution of removal proceedings and execution of a removal order until the
order has become final. Therefore, in a variety of contexts, courts have held
that section 242(g) does not apply outside of removal proceedings. 4
The same reasoning applies to Bivens and FTCA claims. These claims
constitute collateral challenges to removal proceedings in two ways. First,
damages claims do not challenge a noncitizen's removal, but instead the
lawfulness and constitutionality of the immigration officials' arrest, detention,
and treatment of the plaintiff while in custody. Therefore, they do not
challenge one of the three discrete actions mentioned in section 242(g). Second,
when plaintiffs seek damages they are not challenging the removal process, but
rather requesting monetary redress for the government's unlawful conduct.
They do not seek any relief from their underlying removal orders. In almost all
damages cases, the final order of removal has already either been carried out or
vacated. Therefore, damages claims could not prolong a noncitizen's removal
42. Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999).
43. See discussion supra Part I.
44. See, e.g., Barahona-Gomez v. Reno, 236 F.3d 1115, 1118 (9 th Cir. 2001) (finding that section
242(g) does not preclude review of collateral claims that do not seek merits review of the
outcome of removal proceedings, but instead go to collateral issues that do not "contribut[e]
to the deconstruction, fragmentation, and hence prolongation of removal proceedings -the
evils meant to be remedied by the statute" (citations omitted)); Sabhari v. Reno, 197 F.3d
938, 940 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding section 242(g) inapplicable in adjustment of status
proceeding); Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1052 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining that section
242(g) does not apply to "collateral challenges to unconstitutional practices and policies used
by the agency" (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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proceedings or otherwise challenge the validity of a removal order. 4' They
merely seek compensation for injuries resulting from alleged torts or
constitutional violations.46
CONCLUSION
The government's interpretation of section 242(g) is simply one byproduct
of the Bush Administration's general hostility to claims brought by noncitizens
to vindicate their constitutional rights.47 While it is still too early to tell if
President Obama will alter the previous Administration's stance on section
242(g) or other barriers to legal relief for immigrants, initial indications are not
promising.48 As is, the federal government's interpretation of section 242(g)
45. In some cases, filing damages actions have prolonged noncitizens' removal proceedings. For
example, in Barrera v. Boughton, ICE agreed to a stay of removal proceedings if the
noncitizen plaintiffs agreed to a stay of discovery in the damages lawsuit. See, e.g., Joint
Motion To Hold Appeals in Abeyance, In re Barrera, A98 300 502 (B.I.A. Aug. 14, 20o8) (on
file with author). While cases like Barrera appear to go against section 242's purpose of
ensuring the timely removal of noncitizens, it was the government's strategic decision to
agree to the stay of removal proceedings. ICE could have foregone its desire to stay
discovery, the removal proceedings could have proceeded as is, and the noncitizens could
have continued litigating the damages actions even if they had been removed from the
United States. That is, there is nothing inherent in filing a damages action that prolongs a
noncitizen's deportation from the United States.
46. See, e.g., Medina v. United States, 92 F. Supp. 2d 545, 552-53 (E.D. Va. 2ooo), vacated on other
grounds, 259 F.3d 220 (4th Cir. 2001) (denying government's motion to dismiss FTCA claim
by noncitizen because he did not challenge his removal, but rather demanded compensation
for the violation of his rights).
47. Stella Burch Elias, Good Reason to Believe: Widespread Constitutional Violations in the Course of
Immigration Enforcement and the Casefor Revisiting Lopez-Mendoza, 2008 Wis. L. REv. 11o9,
1152 ("In the wake of 9/11, a number of statutory measures and agency schemes were
introduced that further restricted the rights of aliens held by the federal government.").
48. For example, in Barrera v. Boughton, Obama Administration lawyers followed their
predecessors by arguing that section 242(g) barred damages claims by immigrant day
laborers arrested in an undercover sting operation. See Transcript of Motions Hearing at 23-
24, Barrera v. Boughton, No. 3:07CV1436 (D. Conn. Mar. 10, 2009). Similarly, in Arar v.
Ashcroft, the government maintained that immigration agents are immune from a Bivens suit
brought by a Canadian citizen sent to Syria to be tortured. See Aar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp.
2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 20o6), aff'd on other grounds, No. o6-4216-cv, 2009 WL 3522887 (2d Cir.
Nov. 2, 2009); Mark Sherman, Ex-Bush Officials Face Lawsuits over Their Actions,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 29, 2009, available at http://www.boston.com/
news/nation/washington/articles/2009/09/29/exbushofficials-face lawsuits overtheir_
actions. However, high-level Obama Administration officials have argued in the past that
section 242(g) should not bar damages actions. See David A. Martin, On Counterintuitive
Consequences and Choosing the Right Control Group: A Defense of Reno v. AADC, 14 GEO.
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creates an unwarranted and unprecedented exception for immigration agents.
Out of all federal government officials, only actions committed by immigration
agents would be completely immune from suit under the FTCA and Bivens. As
Judge Dennis concludes in his dissent in Humphries:
Today we should be more aware than ever that:
Our system of jurisprudence rests on the assumption that all
individuals, whatever their position in government, are subject to
federal law: "No man in this country is so high that he is above the
law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with
impunity. All officers of the government, from the highest to the
lowest, are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it."
I see no reason why the federal official defendants in the present case
have a better claim to a jurisdictional defense to a Bivens action for
money damages than a president, congressman, cabinet member, or
any other federal officer.
49
SAMEER AHMED
IMMIGR. L.J. 363, 376 (2ooo). Therefore, it is not certain that the government will maintain
its present view of section 242(g) in the coming years.
49. Humphries v. Various Fed. USINS Employees, 164 F.3d 936, 951 (5th Cir. 1999) (Dennis,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted) (quoting Davis v. Passman,
442 U.S. 228, 246 (1979)).
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